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Executive Summary 
This report describes the main legal framework for the value chains of the six commodity 
species (or species groups) that are the focus of PrimeFish; Cod, herring, salmon, trout, sea-
bass/sea-bream and pangasius for the European countries Iceland, Faroe Islands, Norway, 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, France, Spain Italy, Greece, Turkey  as well as Canada 
and Vietnam. At the national specific level, a subset of countries are included; Norway, 
Scotland, and Newfoundland (Canada) as well as Denmark and Iceland.   
The report focuses on the legal aspects influencing the competitiveness at the EU seafood 
market for EU as well as non-EU based seafood companies. It does not intend to cover the 
field of regulations which at one hand is a way to establish a common market of fairness and 
transparency for all market actors, but at the other hand can limit the competitiveness of 
individual companies.  As such the report includes the main regulative framework, and 
selected national regulations, which might influence the competitiveness of companies on 
the European market.  
The report consists of three sections; first a general section on the regulative framework and 
competitiveness, second on a supra-national regulation and a third section, examples of 
national regulation of fisheries, aquaculture and processing and trade.  
The supranational regulation sets the framework of international trade agreements in WTO, 
and other bi- or multilateral agreements, including CETA and TTIP and considerations of the 
conditions after Brexit (the UK leaving the EU). This section also touches upon the EU 
regulation of the seafood sector, fisheries and aquaculture, trade tariffs, competition 
regulation of the increasingly consolidated sector and health and environmental regulation.  
The third part of the report addresses central elements of the national regulation; in regard 
to national implementation of EU (or EEA) regulation, and purely national regulations, which 
influence the national seafood industry in the competitiveness at the European seafood 
market. This section looks across four nations and their regulation of fisheries, aquaculture 
and processing/trade respectively. 
The report creates a general overview of the central regulations for the seafood industry 
competing at the European Market. How these influence the specific value chain and 
company is highly case sensitive and therefore to be seen in the case studies.  
General findings are that the framework for trade and competition is the general 
international trade agreements WTO, though modified by various supplementing 
agreements at collective (EU) and bilateral level as  EEA (The European Economic Area), 
CETA (The Canadian-European Trade Agreement) and possibly (TTIP) The Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership. Recently, the ongoing institutional shock of Brexit might change 
the conditions for trade and competition between UK fisheries and the rest of Europe within 
and outside EU.  
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Within the EU the companies are regulated by general EU regulations often in national 
implementation, which allow some national specific differences. Due to international 
agreements (e.g. the EA agreement) non-EU member states to a high degree are also 
regulated in the same line as within EU. The primary sector is regulated by the CFP (Common 
Fisheries Policy), but also influenced by general policies as import regulation, competition 
regulation (e.g. limits concentration and market control), and environmental regulation and 
labour market regulations.  
In general, the primary sector—fisheries and aquaculture—faces issues regarding entrance 
and allocation of access rights. The entrance barriers and fishing access through limited 
entry policies regulate participants in the fisheries, while for aquaculture the issue is spatial 
and ecological competition with other maritime activities.  Especially for the fisheries, the 
national form of allocation of the rights or access privileges to the resources, influences the 
development and competitiveness of the industry. The trend has been individual ownership 
of fishing rights and different forms for transferability between the actors, which generally 
has led to consolidation and concentration in the capture fisheries. The same trend of 
concentration is seen in the aquaculture sector in most of the surveyed countries.  
Both primary sectors are regulated by fisheries policies (the CFP and national policies), but 
environmental policies outline further pertinent regulations. In the EU and EEA areas, the 
Water Framework Directive (WFD) and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) in 
national implementation are important limitations for the activities. For aquaculture, there 
are various national regulations and authorities involved in determining site allocations, 
regional development plans as well as environmental regulations regarding internal 
environment (e.g. animal health) and external effects in form of emissions, the prevention of 
disease transmission to wildlife, and genetic intermingling between wild and farmed fish.  
Within the EU, entry into the processing or export of seafood is generally not regulated in 
the same way as the primary activities in fisheries or aquaculture are. The processing sector 
though faces other legislative barriers, which can influence their competitiveness. Trade 
regulations regarding raw material access and tariffs on import and export for seafood 
products are the most important and to some degree general production conditions such as 
veterinary, technical regulations and labour regulations (including labour costs) are also 
central for assessing the competitiveness of the national seafood processing industry.   
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1. Introduction  
In this report a market institutional analysis is carried out on the European seafood market and how 
it affects the competitiveness of the industry. The report is a deliverable within the PrimeFish project 
and is a part of WP3, Task 3.2.  
The market institutional analysis links to, and should be seen as an integrated part of the Value Chain 
Analysis, which is the overall theme in WP3, based on global value chain (GVC) analysis (Gereffi et al. 
2005, Ponte 2009), as well as the Porter approach (Porter 1990 and 1998) (see more details in the 
forthcoming deliverable 3.4).   
This report is rooted in an institutionalist paradigm, drawing inspiration from authors that recognize 
how institutions evolve and thus orient firms toward particular practices (North 1990, North 1993, 
Gereffi et al. 2005). From an institutional point of view governance structures, as the power relations 
within the value chain (Gereffi et. al. 2005) as well as the formal regulative structures (North 1990), 
are parts of the market institutions. In addition, values institutionalised into norms or identities can 
be a part of the institutional framework for the operation of a company, in a specific locality, 
environment or value chain (Coriat & Dosi, 1998). The value chain analysis will though only address 
informal institutions if they are seen as an explanatory factor for behaviour of a single company or 
part of a value chain. 
In the PrimeFish context the informal institutions are not central, but might be included as an 
explanatory factor for the behaviour of a single company or part of a value chain. This report does 
therefore not evaluate informal institutions, organisation structure, traditions, culture and market 
path dependency; this will be covered for selected individual case studies where applicable in 
deliverable 3.4.  
It is important to be aware that European seafood companies operate in complex markets with 
multifaceted interface at local and global level. Therefore, in principle, almost all legal framework 
and regulation could influence the operation and competitiveness of the companies. Nonetheless 
Deliverable 3.2 addresses the elements of the legal framework at European level, which seem most 
important for the competitiveness in the value chain of the chosen case species, cod, herring, 
salmon, freshwater trout, sea-bass and see-bream. Various regulations influences the operation of 
an individual company. Seen from a company level some regulation might limit the operation and 
thereby the possible profitability of the company. In this regard, general regulations are taken into 
consideration that might have different implementation and impacts between the countries as well 
as those that seem to create un-level playing fields.  
The report thus focuses on the supranational level, WTO and especially the EU regulation, both 
sector specific and cross-sector regulation, followed by national regulations seen from a Danish, 
Icelandic, Norwegian, Scottish and Canadian (Newfoundland) perspective. Although the European 
national regulations for a large part are implementation of EU regulation, there are differences, 
which influence the competitiveness of the national industry.   
The report is made in parallel with development of in depth case studies at company and species 
group level conducted as a part of WP 3. As such it is based on preliminary experiences, and specific 
national reports on the legal framework from Denmark, Iceland, Norway, UK (Scotland) and Canada 
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(Newfoundland). The report is therefore supposed to help focus on the relevant legal aspects in the 
ongoing process of finalising the case studies.   
2. The regulative framework and competitiveness  
Criticism is often laid against regulations—sector-specific or environmental—arguing that such laws 
and statutes limit the competitiveness of firms and the growth. However, as Europe, largely through 
the EU, has tried to establish a common market, it requires rules by which all players or organisations 
must play. Additionally, as North (1990, 1993) highlights, markets and the coordination of exchange 
arose in the Western world largely through the ability to defend property rights and establish 
expectations of fairness and the “institutions that will permit anonymous, impersonal exchange 
across time and space,” (North 1993). Bromley reminds us of the distinction between property, “a 
claim to a benefit (or income) stream,” whereas a property right is “a claim to a benefit stream that 
some higher body—usually the state—will agree to protect through the assignment of duty to others 
who may covet, or somehow interfere with, the benefit stream,” (Bromley 1992). As markets and 
Western conception of property pervade our thinking, it can be all too easy to forget that indeed 
established norms, expectations, and a common understanding of the access to legal recourse in 
property disputes are important to the performance of firms and their competitiveness. 
Consequently, rules and regulations governing seafood Value Chains and their interrelated firms 
include anti-trust regulations, environmental protection, fishing access privileges and stock 
sustainability precautions. In addition, the means that Western culture has developed to secure 
property rights and to enable a degree of predictability of markets—what one can do, which claims 
one can defend, and the legal mechanisms that allow one to defend those claims.   
In addition, the public interest is served through regulations and institutions but also in protecting 
health and safety, as well as the environment, and against monopolies. Health and safety provisions 
are relevant throughout the value chain, from occupational safety provisions for fishermen and 
workers, risk mitigation and accident protocols, as well as consumer protections to ensure safe, 
edible products. Firms have a shared interest in providing clean and safe products to the market and 
to the public both ethically, but also because safety recalls and outbreaks affect public confidence in 
brands and products. Once again, certainty and predictability underpin the reasons for regulation of 
these value chains.   
Nevertheless, regulations may have differentiating impact for less developed versus more developed 
firms and countries in terms of access to markets and meeting particular requirements. Although 
equal protection and equal distribution or regulatory burden may establish a level playing field, 
questions of equity prevail. Thus, the following text provides an overview of the regulations that 
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3. Supra national regulation 
The seafood value chains and companies are regulated based on international agreements which are 
adjusted at lower levels. Here EU trade agreements with European countries via the EEA-agreement, 
and planned bilateral agreements with Canada (CETA) and US (TTIP) will be briefly discussed as they 
can change the competitive conditions at the European market. Within EU/Europe sector specific 
and other, especially environmental regulations are addressed.  
3.1 International trade agreements and rules 
International trade is in general regulated by international rules set by WTO, The World Trade 
Organisation. WTO has 164 members, nationals but also EU as a group. WTO (the successor of GATT) 
has the overall purpose to enable a free flow of trade, as this is seen as important for economic 
development and well-being. This is done by removing various legal obstacles. In order to get 
transparent and predictable rules worldwide, so individuals, companies and governments know the 
trade rules and have confidence in predictability by avoiding sudden changes of policy. At the other 
hand though also taking into consideration „undesirable side effects“ and therefore some trade 
barriers could be maintained, e.g. to protect consumers or prevent the spread of disease (WTO 
(n.d.)a). 
This influences the legal framework in this case also. As an example the prevention of spreading of 
diseases is handled partly by an specific Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement) (WTO )n.d.)b), which concerns the application of food safety and animal 
and plant health regulations. This can reduce the free trade of items which can spread diseases or 
endanger the food safety (addressed in 4.3.3). The general principal within the WTO countries is to 
ensure same trading conditions, that all nations are regarded as Most-favoured nations (MFN). This 
key principle means that a lower customs duty offered by one member of WTO to another country 
must be extended to all other members of the WTO. But a country (here EU) can make a free trade 
agreement with more favourable treatment to the participating states than to the other WTO 
members (though this is under strict conditions by the WTO). This means that the trade agreements 
mentioned here: EAA, CETA and TTIP are exceptions from the general agreement under WTO.  
3.1.1 EEA agreement  
The European Economic Area (EEA), which came into force in 1994, builds upon and furthers the EU’s 
internal market provisions set out in the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). Notable for the cases in 
PrimeFish, Norway and Iceland are members of the EEA in addition to the EU member states.4 When 
a country joins the EU, it also becomes party to the EEA through Article 128. As an extension of the 
internal market of the EFTA, “The EEA incorporates the four freedoms of the internal market (free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital) and related policies (competition, transport, 
energy and economic and monetary cooperation),” (EFTA n.d). However, in regard to fisheries, the 
EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) supersedes and regulates fishing activities within the EU, with 
certain provisions for the trade of fishery products addressed in the EEA agreement. 
                                                          
4 Switzerland, which is part of EFTA, is not part of the EEA. Lichtenstein is part of the EEA.  
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The implications for processed seafood within the EEA is that some products processed in these EEA 
countries is not subject to a tariff, whereas products imported into the EEA from outside is subject to 
tariffs. For example, cod filets processed in Iceland are not subject to an import tariff, whereas cod 
filets processed in a third country such as the United States would be subject to an 18% import tariff. 
Consequently, these differentiating taxation schemes affect the competitiveness of firms hoping to 
sell product on the European market, but also those firms that may choose to outsource portions of 
the processing to third countries. Nevertheless, trade agreements between the EU and third 
countries may also differentiate products within the value chain and impact competitiveness.  
3.1.2 Bilateral agreements between EU and Canada and USA 
The trade conditions are under constant development in on-going negotiations between the EU and 
third party countries. Notable for fisheries value chains are the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) between the United States and the EU. As neither is officially in practice, the 
effects on value chains are hypothetical and try to capture various possible scenarios. CETA has 
progressed farther than TTIP, especially in light of the American presidential election and 
administrative change at the end of 2016 and into early 2017. 
    Canadian European Trade Agreement (CETA) 
The European Parliament voted in favour of the Canadian European Trade Agreement (CETA) on 15 
February 2017 and now requires approval from the national parliaments of EU member states before 
it takes effect. In addition to traditional trade agreement provisions such as the relaxation and 
removal of tariffs and trade barriers, the agreement also targets the issue of environmental 
sustainability and good labour practices (European Commission. DG Trade (n.d).a.).  
 
A key component of the agreement is the elimination of customs duties for imports of goods 
originating in the EU and Canada. Both countries have agreed to fully eliminate tariffs on fisheries 
products. One factor that has inhibited the Canadian seafood sector’s capacity to acquire market 
share in Europe in the past is the negative effect of tariffs. Canadian fish and seafood exports to the 
EU currently face tariffs of up to 25%. With the enactment of CETA, those tariff rates will change. 
When the agreement comes into force, almost 96% of EU fish and seafood tariff lines will be duty-
free. Seven years after CETA comes into force, 100% of these tariff lines will be duty-free (European 
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Table 1. EU tariff elimination under CETA, selected products within the PrimeFish case species (cod 
(whitefish), herring, trout and salmon. 
Upon entry into force, 96% of EU fish and seafood tariff lines will be immediately eliminated 
(2015 rate shown): 
Fresh or chilled hake (15%) 
Dried and salted cod (13%) 
Frozen herring (15%) 
Frozen mackerel (20%) 
Fresh or chilled halibut (15%) 
Fresh mussels (8% or 10% depending on species) 
Salmon (2% to 15% depending on species ) 
Processed salmon (5.5%) 
Remaining EU fish and seafood tariffs will be phased out over 7 years (2015 rate shown): 
Frozen fillets of cod (7.5%) 
Processed fillet of trout, including smoked (9% and 12%) 
Source: International Trade Division Canada 2017. 
 
Canada already has market access to the EU for certain fisheries products through autonomous EU 
tariff rate quota (TRQs). To facilitate the transition to CETA, the EU will offer two transitional duty 
free TRQs for 23,000 tonnes of Canadian shrimp and 1,000 tonnes of frozen Canadian cod. TRQ’s will 
expire once tariffs have been fully eliminated under CETA (European Commission 2016).  
Elimination of tariffs through CETA will make Canadian seafood products more competitive in the EU 
and is expected to unlock new opportunities by opening new markets for fish and seafood exports, 
which already in 2015 reached 599 million Can $ (appr 400 mill. €) (European Commission 2016, 
International Trade Division Canada 2017). The CETA agreement will give Canada a time-limited first-
mover advantage at the EU market over a range of competitors also negotiating special trade 
agreements: Vietnam, Thailand, India, United States, Argentina and China. Canada currently ranks 
10th among fish and seafood suppliers to the EU with a 2.4% share of the import market 
(International Trade Division Canada 2017).  
The CETA agreement includes other requirements and exceptions from the general rules. As an 
example, the CETA Rules of Origin Matter, where Canada accept its exports of fisheries products 
should meet the preferential Rules of Origin (RoO) of the EU. Due to difficulties for certain Canadian 
exporters to meet these rules a limited number of products and within a limited volume of imports 
are excluded (European Commission 2016). In general the export with preferential tariff treatment in 
the EU should be wholly obtained, but some processed product of e.g. prepared or preserved salmon 
and processed herring within some limits can contain materials imported from countries other than 
EU. Independently of CETA, Canadian seafood export must meet a range of general EU criteria as 
other fish and seafood exported to the EU (see 3.2.2). The products must come from an approved 
establishment, a catch certificate documenting legal catch, labelling according to the EU regulation of 
2014, health certificate from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency and respect to the EU 
requirements regarding maximum Residue Levels (for example, cadmium in oysters (International 
Trade Division Canada 2017). 
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   Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership - TTIP 
The negotiation between the EU and US regarding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) continues and the deal’s future is uncertain after the 2016 American presidential 
election. President Barack Obama and his administration had worked with EU leaders to develop the 
trade agreement, but President Trump has indicated he may not sign TTIP.  
TTIP is a wide ranging multinational trade deal linking the American and European markets for trade 
and harmonization of practices and standards. Fisheries value chains would be affected by TTIP in 
various ways. Leaked documents received in May 2016 and dated March 2016, reveal that “the 
objective [in the field of fisheries] is to have complete liberalization in this sector, with a symmetrical 
dismantlement of tariffs for the sensitive products” (Anon 2016, p 5).  
The potential, direct impact of full market liberalisation is not known, but based on the overall 
indications (below) appears to open the EU market in general more than the US market. The value of 
all export of seafood from EU to US of seafood made up 10-14 % of all export value (and 5 % of total 
import value) the outcome of this agreement might be of significant importance for the EU seafood 
industry and its competitiveness. At present most products are without import tariff for EU export to 
the US, with few exceptions, such as frozen flatfish and sardines, a few fresh products, salted dried or 
smoked herring and mackerel in certain packages , crab meat and others (European Commission. DG 
Trade (n.d.)b). Most fish products imported into EU are subject to an import tariff up to 22% 
(European Commission 2015).5 
The indirect consequences of the TTIP are even less clear. In the negotiations the TTIP is quite 
comprehensive and will apparently include regulatory cooperation, which might influence on the 
general regulative systems in the EU –in the catch and aquaculture sector, as well further in the value 
chain.  
Studies on the impact of TTIP estimate a 9% rise in the European processed foods sector, which 
captures some aspects of fisheries value chains. Fisheries is subsumed under a shared category with 
Agriculture and Forestry, may benefit from the very small projected output increase of 0.06% 
(European Commission 2013b). However, there is some uncertainty in this estimate because of the 
model’s inability to fold in weather events and natural disasters that affect agriculture. Moreover, 
very little detail is provided specific to fisheries in the European Commission’s report, based on the 
study conducted by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (Francois et al 2013). A study utilizing a 
different methodology has been less positive toward the gains projected by the CEPR report 
(Felbemeyr, Heid, and Lehwald 2013).  
The 2016 election of American President Donald Trump resulted in questions to the viability of the 
TTIP in its current form and whether central tenets of the trade agreement could be rectified. 
                                                          
5 Regarding fisheries, the leaked documents from the 12. Rounds of negotiations just state:   
Fisheries 
As part of the 12th negotiating round, the EU and the US held a discussion on market access in the area of 
fisheries. The purpose of the meeting was to explore each side's export interest with a view on how to balance 
those with respective sensitive domestic interests. Both Parties explained their offensive and defensive interests. 
The US will now need to complete and improve its offer to reduce the current gap. The objective is to have 
complete liberalization in this sector, with a symmetrical dismantlement of tariffs for the sensitive products.  
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Various scenarios in connection to the Trump Administration and TTIP exist, here from Tereza 
Novotna 2017, Post-doctoral researcher at the Institute for European Studies at Université libre de 
Bruxelles in Brussels. On one end of the spectrum, TTIP could be completely dismissed by the US and 
negotiations would either start again or come to a complete standstill between the EU and the US. At 
the other extreme, the Trump Administration could push forward on TTIP seeking to get the 
agreement in place. There are other variations to these scenarios, where the timeline for agreement 
is greatly elongated, perhaps past Trump’s Presidency, as it does not merit a top priority of his 
administration. There are still questions as to the public acceptance among Europeans, especially if 
the deal morphs toward the “America first” rhetoric expounded by President Trump and appears to 
overwhelmingly benefit American multinational corporations (Novotna, 2017).   
3.1.3 Potential Implications of Brexit  
UK has been an integrated part of EU since 1973 with full integration also in the Fisheries policy. But 
in 2016 UK chose to leave the EU and negotiations are still to take place regarding the terms under 
which the UK will leave and continue to interact with the EU. There is a lot of uncertainty around the 
outcomes of Brexit with consequences for the UK seafood sector as well as the seafood sector in the 
rest of the EU. It has been indicated that the UK will pursue a ‘hard’ (or ‘clean’) Brexit where the UK 
will leave the EU’s Single Market in order to reclaim control over immigration and regulations. 
Regarding trade of seafood products, a Brexit might change relations on the markets. Seafood 
originating from the UK (fisheries or aquaculture), is largely exported for overseas consumption, 
mainly the EU countries, while UK consumption is largely dependent on imports. In the EU single 
market there are no tariffs on goods moving between Member States. But as Garrett (2016) notes, 
without tariffs UK exports/imports would trade at world prices, governed by WTO rules. Although 
‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) tariffs in the EU have been moving downward, and tariffs incurred on 
seafood products under WTO/MFN rules are moderate, UK seafood exporters and importers would 
be subject to challenging price competition from lower cost nations. There may be possible 
transitional ‘EU free-trade’ agreement in key sectors. Nevertheless, in 2016, Noble et al. (2016) 
reports that processing industry members express concerns regarding lack of information regarding 
what new terms of trade would replace existing trade agreements as a significant source of 
uncertainty, hindering business planning. 
The UK seafood processing industry relies heavily on EU and EEA workers. In the Scottish fish 
processing industry, for example, local highly skilled long-term staff forms a smaller share of the 
processing labour force, with workers usually in their late career stages and fewer young recruits. A 
restriction on entering/staying in the UK by migrant workers can create difficulties in this sector (BDA 
Plus, 2015). Industry representatives have expressed anxiety around what arrangements the UK 
would implement for existing EU staff. Being able to continue to recruit EU and EEA staff in the future 
is considered to be very important (Noble et al., 2016).  
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is particularly unpopular among British fishermen. It is blamed for 
having taken away fishermen’s livelihoods and ‘giving away’ UK fish. However, analysis of historical 
data for the UK shows that the decline of catches occurred prior to the introduction of the CFP in 
1983 (Thurstan et al., 2010). Nevertheless the common fisheries policy and the agreement on 
relative stability has distributed fish quota for fish caught in the British zone to fishers from other 
countries of historical reasons. Furthermore there is a significant “foreign ownership” of the UK 
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quota, by vessels sailing under British flag and holding UK FQAs but landing the catch in the country 
of de facto ownership, typically Spain or Holland. With the Brexit, UK can leave also the agreements 
around the CFP and regain the rights of access to the UK 200 nautical miles marine territory (or the 
midline to closer nations) according to the UN Law of the Sea. Brexit therefore might have important 
consequences for reallocation of the rights to fish in the UK waters, as the access to the UK EEZ by 
foreign vessels and to EU waters by UK vessels would be subject to negotiation.  
The UN Law of the Sea Convention requires a Nation State to conserve and manage marine 
resources, co-operate to conserve and manage specific stocks, and the trade-offs between 
conservation and fishing. There would therefore be a requirement for some kind of arrangement to 
support fisheries management, access, data collection and marine conservation (Garrett, 2016). 
3.2 EU regulation of the seafood sector 
3.2.1 The European Common Fisheries Policy, CFP, including aquaculture 
The CFP is a set of rules for managing European fishing fleets and conserving fish stocks. Designed to 
manage a common resource, it gives all European fishing fleets equal access to EU waters and fishing 
grounds and allows fishermen to compete fairly.   
The CFP is pertain to the first stage in the seafood value chain, determines fishing access rights for 
particular Member States and the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for species in EU waters. The CFP 
determines the governance and management of marine fisheries in EU waters (European Counsel 
and Parliament 2013). 
The fisheries management and control limits the resources available in form of Total Allowable Catch 
(TAC), the amount of fish landed in total, usually set on a yearly basis. The yearly TAC is then divided 
and allocated among the member states and at national level between the participants in the 
fisheries. The distribution between the member states is regulated by the relative stability, while the 
distribution mechanisms to the fishers at national level differ. These limits on both the total amount 
of fish landed and how it is distributed among Europe’s fishers influences the volume of intra-EU 
supply of material for the seafood sector.  
The CFP creates an organisational framework for fishers with the Producers Organisations, POs as the 
central organisational unit for the catching sector. The market organisation in the CFP further defines 
the consumer information and thereby set a basic standard for information to be attached to the 
fishery and aquaculture products sold to consumers and mass caterers. (see 2.3.2 regarding the POs 
special position in the competition policy) 
The CFP also contains a paragraph on promoting sustainable aquaculture. This is elaborated in a 
document on strategic guidelines for improving sustainable development of EU Aquaculture 
(European Commission 2013a), which points to simplifying the administrative procedures and 
coordinated spatial planning as central factors for enhancing the EU aquaculture sector.  
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3.2.2 Regulation of import of seafood  
Import of seafood into the EU is regulated by implementation of the principle of quality management 
and process-oriented controls throughout the food chain. To implement these harmonized 
principles, the Food and Veterinary office of the European Commission is undertaking missions in all 
exporting countries. If positive, the European Commission recognises and certifies the competent 
authority of the non-EU country. For all fishery products, countries of origin must be on the positive 
list of eligible countries for the relevance product. The eligibility criteria include specific key 
elements:  
 competent authority, which guaranties that animal health controls and monitoring 
programmes are enforced,  
 hygiene and public health in the value chain from aquaculture or vessels, landing sites, 
processing, freezing and storage,  
 a close monitoring of the production areas to exclude contamination with certain marine 
biotoxins and finally  
 specifically in aquaculture, control plans on heavy metals, contaminants, residues of 
pesticides and veterinary drugs. (European Commission n.d.) 
Further imported products are obliged to be labelled with a range of product information; name of 
the product, production methods, country of origin, presentation, net weight, EU seller, EU approval 
number and nutritious content (Blaha, 2008).   
Besides the health and quality regulation imported seafood is regulated by trade tariffs and 
contingents for specific fish products, as mentioned in the general trade description in 3.1.  The tariff 
and contingents also form a central framework condition for the value chains. Every third year the EU 
establishes autonomous tariff quotas for specific fish and fish products. The autonomous tariff 
quotas are quantity of products which can be imported into EU at a tariff rate lower than the 
ordinary.  These tariff quotas are established to increase the supply of raw material to the EU 
processing industry. The quotas of product imports are specified to certain timeframes within the 
year in order to stabilise raw material supply for the industry. Outside of these specified timeframes 
and in situations when the tariff quotas are exhausted, the low tariffs of typically 0%, 4% or 6% 
increase to a 10-15% import tariff.   
The duty and tariffs are specified on product categories, and country, following the different types of 
trade agreements, as mentioned in the introduction to section 2. A general tariff for the Most 
Favoured Nations (MFN), according to the WTO agreements, but different tariffs for some former 
colonies, EEA countries and bilateral agreements.  
This means that the exact trade conditions, tariffs, quotas and other regulations regarding 
requirements of approvals and documentation for production conditions, health and safety etc. can 
be quite complex. To ease the process of trading under such complex regulation, EU has establish a 
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database where the exact updated regulation can be found at the “Market Access Database” (MADB) 
http://madb.europa.eu/madb/indexPubli.htm. (European Commission. DG Trade (n.d.)b)6  
3.2.3 Competition regulation 
The Competition regulation in some cases has influenced the competitiveness of companies in the 
European Seafood market. In general the competition regulation is established in order to reduce 
distortions to competition within the internal market through merger control, antitrust enforcement, 
and state aid control (see the box below). The responsibility for enforcement of the rules is in the 
hand of the Directive Generale Competition (European Commission DG Growth (n.d.), Consolidated 
version).  
Textbox 1: Competition Policy – three strands. From European Commission DG Growth (n.d.)  
There are examples of use of the different elements of the Competition policy.  
The general anti-trust regulation is derogated in regard the producer organisations in the fisheries, 
which are regulated in the regulation 1379/2013 (European Parliament and the Council 2013) setting 
the conditions for the producer organisation for the fishery. In principle the standard competition 
rules also apply to fishery and aquaculture products, but there are some specific derogations. The 
derogations regards especially article 101(1) in the TFEU (Consolidated version of the Treaty) which 
regards prohibition of “directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions.” This allows the POs to make “agreements, decisions and practices of producer 
organisations which concern the production or sale of fishery and aquaculture products, or the use of 
joint facilities for the storage, treatment or processing of fishery and aquaculture products.” 
(European Parliament and the Council 2013).  
                                                          




Antitrust is an important tool to protect European firms from practices that adversely affect 
competition such as price fixing, patent abuses, capacity hoarding, or the prevention of cross-
border activities. 
Merger Control 
Merger control ensures European consumers and businesses are protected against price 
increases and other anti-competitive effects resulting from mergers, whilst simultaneously 
helping firms in restructuring and enhancing their global reach through mergers. 
State Aid Control 
State aid control is essential to avoid distortions in the Single Market, whilst also ensuring that 
subsidies that promote the competitiveness of sectors and companies are allowed. The EU's 
State aid regime - a system that is unique in the world - provides a framework that focuses aid 
on addressing market failures. 
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Merger control has been used in the seafood sector in a few instances, mainly in the relative high-
consolidated aquaculture sector, where the competition rules have been used to control and limit 
mergers (e.g. Marine Harvest – merger of Morpol, which the Commission saw as establishing a 
monopoly at the Scottish salmon market. In order to address the Commission's concerns, Marine 
Harvest committed to divest the largest part of Morpol's salmon farming operations in Scotland, 
based in Shetland and the Orkneys. These divestments address the competition concerns created by 
the merger, because they remove a substantial part of the overlap between the parties' activities in 
the relevant market. (European Commission 2014b and c). However, according to the case-database 
of DG Competition there are only few examples of EU objections to state aid or mergers in the 
fisheries processing sector 
Finally the state aid control has previously been used against Norway, and latest in a situation where 
the European Commission based on complaints from several European member states announced 
the initiation of an anti-subsidy proceeding with regard to imports into the Union of certain rainbow 
trout originating in Turkey. The relative complex proceeding concluded that a number of Turkish 
trout farms had received state aid and countervailing duty rates, expressed on the CIF Union border 
price, customs duty unpaid, were put on import from e number of named Turkish trout companies 
(European Commission 2014a) 
 
3.3 Environmental and labour regulation 
3.3.1 Environmental regulation  
Other areas of EU policies can strongly influence especially the primary sectors, which forms the first 
link of the seafood value chains, and thereby the competitiveness of the total sector. Especially three 
so called “framework directives” are of importance; The Water framework directive, the Marine 
framework strategy directive and the framework directive for maritime spatial planning. The EU 
framework directives sets a framework of general goals and methods for development at the specific 
area. But it is within national processes that the specific objectives of the policy, the means to reach 
the objectives as well as implementation are to be obtained. Therefore, despite of the same 
framework directives, the specific configuration of means will differ between the countries, and 
therefore the consequences for fisheries and aquaculture might also differ.  
The Water Framework Directive (European Commission, 2000) intends to achieve good qualitative 
and quantitative status of all water bodies in the EU. The directive aims for good environmental 
status for all ground and surface waters, covering inland waters and marine waters up to one 
nautical mile from shore. The overall goal, cleaner water will give better living conditions for aquatic 
ecosystems, and thereby also for the fisheries. But restraints on emissions of nitrate and phosphorus 
from aquaculture has been the barrier for growth for land- and sea-based farms in some places. 
The Marine Framework Strategy Directive aims to protect the marine environment in Europe by 
reaching “Good environmental status” within 11 descriptors. Among these descriptors, four relate 
especially to the fisheries: Biological diversity, Commercial exploitation of fish and shellfish, Foodweb 
integrity, and Seafloor integrity. Notably, seafloor integrity broadens the perspective from what was 
traditionally fisheries policy, and has in some cases led to closures of larger marine areas (also fishing 
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areas), not due to protection of target species or bycatch, but due to concerns of seafloor and 
broader ecosystem issues (European Parliament and the Council 2008).  
The Framework Directive for Maritime Spatial Planning (European Parliament and the Council 2014) 
aims to ensure that human activities at sea “are as efficient and sustainable as possible. Maritime 
spatial planning involves stakeholders in a transparent way in the planning of maritime activities” 
(European Commission. DG Maritime Affairs 2016). The specific Maritime Spatial planning could limit 
the operational areas for the fishing fleets, but could also ensure sea areas for fishing and especially 
aquaculture activities by reserving these areas for these purposes.  
3.3.2 Labour market regulation 
In an addition to the free movement of goods, the EU and the EEA have also prioritised the free 
movement of European citizens in search of work. The EU member states, in addition to the EEA 
signatories of Iceland, Norway, and Lichtenstein, allow citizens of their countries to move and reside 
in other EEA countries for the purpose of employment. The European Commission outlines the rights 
of EU citizens in this regard, as these persons can: 
 Search for work in another EU country 
 Work in another EU country without a work permit 
 Reside in another country for the purpose of work 
 Remain in the country after the employment is done 
 Be treated equally with nationals in access to work, working conditions, and other social and 
tax benefits (European Commission. DG Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion (n.d.)).    
 
The free movement of workers within the EEA can benefit firms operating within these countries as 
they have access to a larger labour pool and reduce the concerns for work permit applications for 
European citizens. In addition, the free movement of labour also allows firms to recruit workers with 
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4. National regulation, central elements (in selected countries) 
This section focuses on central legal frameworks for seafood value chains at the national level, based 
on experiences from six of the PrimeFish countries: Denmark, Spain and UK (all within the EU), 
Norway and Iceland (both under the EEA) and the Atlantic Canada/Newfoundland (outside both the 
EU and EEA). Relevant to PrimeFish, the section covers capture fisheries in Denmark, Norway, Iceland 
and Newfoundland and aquaculture in Denmark, Spain, Norway and the UK (Scotland). The focus is 
on legal elements functioning as barriers to entry or influencing the competitiveness of the seafood 
companies. This section does not cover all legal issues influencing the companies in the seafood 
value chains, but those that are salient to the case studies in PrimeFish and would be relevant to 
those establishing new businesses.7  
In general, the primary sector—fisheries and aquaculture—faces issues regarding entrance and 
allocation of access rights. The entrance barriers in the fisheries regard regulation of participants, 
while for aquaculture it regards spatial and ecological competition with other maritime activities.  
Especially for the fisheries, the national form of allocation of the rights or access privileges to the 
resources influences the development and competitiveness of the industry. The ownership form and 
possibility of transferability, which often results in consolidation and concentration in capture 
fisheries (McCay, 1995 and Eythórsson, 2000). Furthermore, different types of environmental 
regulation influence the primary sector. In contrast, fewer sector-specific issues influence processing 
and trade segments of the value chain, but general production conditions, labour regulations 




Fisheries and fishing activities are regulated in order to secure a sustainable use of the resources; in 
EU according to the CFP and its implementation in national policy. Fishing access, primarily through 
limited entry policies, often requires that fishers register or hold a license to fish. In many nations, 
fishing access is further limited by catch shares, which require fishers to obtain shares of quotas of 
certain species in order to go fishing and namely to land the fish caught. Apart from the conservation 
focus of the regulations, economic, as well as social and regional, interests are central.  
4.1.1 Limited entry 
Some countries limit fishing access to those individuals registered as a fisher (Norway, Iceland, 
Denmark and partly Newfoundland, see boxes below). Proving one’s status as a registered 
                                                          
7 The following text and text-boxes are based on un-published working papers: 1) Kvalvik, I, Isaksen, J, Svorken, 
M. Hermansen, Ø. 2017 Norwegian regulative framework and industry competitiveness. PrimeFish WP 3.2 – 
Norwegian input to deliverable T3.2. Nofima, Næring og bedrift. 10. march 2017. 2) Taskow, D. 2017 Formal 
regulation within the UK seafood sector -  A report contributing to Deliverable 3.2, University of Stirling, March 
2017, 3) Manuel, H. and Hayter, R. 2017 Memorial University. Fisheries Management in Canada. Newfoundland 
and Labrador. March 2017 and 4) Santiago, J.L and Chapela, R. and Jose L. Santiago, Rosa Chapela, Fernández 
González R. 2017 Spanish Aquaculture Legislation Framework, CETMAR March 2017. 5) Knútsson, Ö and 
Gunnlaugsson, V. N. (2016), Icelandic cod value chain. PrimeFish WP3 input, UICE and Matis 6) Stefansson, G and 
Sigurdardottir, S (2016), The herring value chain in Iceland, WP3 input, MATIS 
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commercial fisher or the owner of a vessel (or the main part of the owners of the capital behind the 
vessel) can be a precondition for holding registered fishing vessel licenses and receiving or buying 
fishing rights. In Norway and Denmark the establishment and maintenance of commercial or active 
fisher status is based on history of being a fisher, being economically dependent on fisheries and in 
some cases citizenship in the respective countries. In contrast, the nationality is restricted for the 
vessel, not the fisher, in the Canadian Atlantic Fishery Regulations (Department of Justice 2017). In a 
similar way in Iceland, according to Fisheries Management Act No 38/1990, no one can catch fish 
inside the Icelandic economic zone without permission from the Ministry of Fisheries, and licences 
are allocated for one year at a time (Anon, 1990). As such the barrier to free entry can be seen as a 
protection of national/regional interests and as such a social concern, “meant to secure that the 
remuneration and returns from fishing (and potential resource rent), is channelled back to local 
coastal communities”, as expressed in the Norwegian case.  
In the UK there is no entry barrier to be registered as a fisher. Foreign skippers have been able to 
register their vessels in the UK ship register and buy one (or more) of the restricted fishing licences. 
Consequently, foreign vessel owners have acquired fishing access privileges and UK quotas by buying 
the vessels and licences needed. This has resulted in many Dutch and Spanish owned and driven 
vessels to be active in the UK fishery or the fishing of the UK’s quotas. Notably, there have been 
several attempts to force the foreign ownership out, e.g. by requirement of 75 % ownership of 
vessels by resident UK nationals (in 1988), but this was overruled by the EU commission (Hatcher et. 
al., 2002).  
It has been argued that international trade of fishing rights could possibly increase the efficiency of 
the fisheries (Hatcher et al., 2002). On the other hand, restrictions to foreign ownership represents 
an important political issue, which was demonstrated in the failed introduction of “transferable 
fishing concessions” in the proposed CFP reform in 2013, largely because of the fear of transferability 
among states (Lado, 2016). Foreign ownership of vessels and quotas has also been used by those 
arguing in favour of the Brexit referendum of leaving the EU—and thereby the CFP.  
4.1.2 Quota allocation at national level 
The means by which the national quota is allocated to fishers influences the structural development 
of the fishing industry, and thereby the competitiveness in seafood markets. The major issue in this 
regard is their transferability and often resultant concentration of the fishing and quotas. By allowing 
concentration of the quotas on fewer vessels, it is possible for the more efficient fishers to buy 
quotas from the less efficient and in that way establish advantage of scale in the sector as has 
become evidence in the Icelandic ITQ system. A precondition of being able to transfer and 
concentrate the quotas is some kind of private (individual or group) right or ownership to use the 
resource. In four of the countries studied here (Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Newfoundland) the 
right to fish a certain quota was at first connected to the vessel (and thereby indirectly to the vessel 
owner), meaning that it could only be transferred as a whole with the vessel. In Norway and 
Denmark this has later been softened so rights to quota can be transferred without the vessel. In 
Denmark, where the transferability is linked to the right to quota shares, these also can be traded in 
fractions.  
In Iceland, a comprehensive management system based on individually transferable quotas ITQs) has 
been in effect since the beginning of 1991 (Anon, 1990). At first the system only applied to vessels 
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larger than 6 gross registered tons (GRT), but in the early 2000s smaller boats were also incorporated 
into the management plan. Both quota shares and harvest rights (see box) may be transferred 
between vessels but transfers from vessels operating under the hook-and-line quotas to vessels 
operating under the regular quota system are though banned. Vessels must however utilise at least 
half of their harvest rights each fishing year or else forfeit their quota shares. The combined quota 
shares of vessels held by individual parties in each fishery may not exceed a certain maximum which 
differs between fisheries. Quotas of different species may be added together using cod equivalents 
which are a special accounting unit defined under the Fisheries Management Act, and based on the 
market value of each species compared to the value of cod. The combined quota holdings of each 
firm, measured in cod equivalents, may not exceed 12% for vessels operating under the regular 
quota system, and 5% for vessels using hook-and-line. The ITQ system in Iceland has led to 
considerable consolidation, both among larger and smaller vessels. At the start of the fishing year 
2014/2015, the 25 largest firms operating vessels in the regular system held almost 75% of the 
quota. The consolidation was not quite as pronounced among smaller vessels, with the 25 largest 
firms operating hook-and-line quotas holding a combined share of 57%.  
In Norway and Newfoundland, transferability is limited to the merging of two vessels if one of the 
vessels is scrapped. The reduction of the fleet without public funding seems to be a central purpose 
here. Denmark has followed the route of Iceland on ITQs, allowing stronger concentration of quota 
shares. Nonetheless, unlimited concentration is not possible, as there are certain limitations on the 
concentration of quota ownership in Denmark. The regulation of concentration has been questioned 
recently as some “ingenious” fishers have found legal ways to de facto control larger shares of the 
quota than intended in the law (Abrahamsen, 2017). The issue discussed in the Danish context is 
whether the concentration of quotas leads to a capital concentration, which allows these larger 
fishing operations to outmatch the minor, individual fishers and smaller fishing companies by being 
able to pay more for vessels/quota shares. This aspect of disfavouring segments of the fleet or 
regional interests is though a subset of the general purpose of the limits on concentration through 
regulations, which is to avoid monopolies and secure competition within the fishing industry (as 
described in 2.3.3).  
The issue of protecting small-scale fishing and minor, smaller ports is a consideration in the resource 
allocation in all the countries studied here. In Norway there are restrictions on transferability of 
rights between regions and vessel types, as well as obligations to land portions of the catch 
regionally. Additionally, the coastal fleet is guaranteed a share of the quotas. Up to 6 % of the 
national quota of cod, haddock and pollock is allocated to a so called “open group” of registered 
fishers on small vessels (mainly side-line fishers). They can freely fish a weekly defined quota. This 
system works as a field for recruitment of fishers and for some for a slow or early retirement from 
fishing. In Denmark a special coastal fishery arrangement has been settled with the introduction of 
ITQs in the demersal fisheries in 2007. The vessels under the coastal fishery arrangements are 
granted extra quota of especially cod; quota cannot be sold out of the group of designated coastal 
fishers, but quota can be bought into this group. The vessels can leave the coastal fishery after at 
least three years in the arrangement. Then they are allowed to sell their quota to vessels outside the 
coastal arrangement. Directly for recruitment a minor share of the national quota is reserved for 
young fishers, which can use a certain quota for a few years, before they have to buy quota. In 
Newfoundland the main part of the quotas for many of the demersal species are allocated to the 
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coastal fleet (i.e. inshore and near shore vessels < 65 ft). Especially in a period with low stocks and 
quotas, this leaves very little demersal resources to the larger vessels in the offshore fleet.  
Likewise in 1990 the Ministry of Fisheries in Iceland was permitted by law to compensate fishing 
companies experiencing a significant income loss, by a temporary increase in their total allowable 
catch (Anon, 1990). A special ITQ for relevant regions, a regional quota, was first implemented in 
1990 when the authorities decided to motivate fisheries to reduce the numbers of fishing vessels. If a 
particular region lost a significant amount of their total ITQ, because of this public objective, the 
Ministry of Fisheries could compensate the community concerned by increasing their total allowable 
catch to reduce the anticipated negative local economic impact of that policy.  The objective of the 
regional quota was widened in 1995, so that it could be activated whenever a certain community had 
a significant negative change in the ITQ, but not only when a ship was sold as had been the case. 
Now a fishery in every municipality in Iceland could apply for compensation. The Icelandic Regional 
Development Institute (Byggðastofnun) was in charge of the regional quota. Iceland introduced in 
2009 a new system for small boat called costal fishing (strandveiði) to allow newcomers to enter the 
system without holding quota as well as supporting fishing villages around Iceland (Anon, 2016). All 
registered boats, including those holding quotas, may join the fishery which runs during May, June, 
July and August. The fishing grounds off Iceland are divided into four areas and a pre-determined 
cod-cap set for each month in each of the areas. The fishery is an open-access fishery and fishing in 
each month and area is suspended once the cap is reached. Each boat may employ a maximum of 
four hand-lines, with daily catches limited to 650 kg.  Coastal fishing is allowed four days a week 
where each fishing trip cannot be longer than 14 hours.  In 2007 9,200 tons of demersal species was 
allocated to Costal fishing.  A total of 560 boats took part in the coastal fishing in May 2017. By 
comparison, 277 boats operated under the hook-and-line quota system at the beginning of the 
fishing year 2016/2017. 
The allocation of rights to participate in the fisheries, as well as the resource allocation is often 
restricted in order to secure employment and resources in different segments of the fleet or regions. 
This might reduce the opportunities for the national industry to concentrate and consolidate and in a 
way, harvest the competitiveness of economy of scale.   
4.1.3 Other regulations in the fisheries: 
The labour regulation of EU means that while ownership of the vessels is restricted to national 
fishermen, there are opportunities to employ crew from EU following the Schengen agreement (as 
described in 2.3.2). In Norway the participation act restricts the level of foreign labour leading to a 
level of 5-10 % foreigners of the total employment on fishing vessels.  
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Text boxes 2: Case-boxes on Central fishing regulations in regard limited entry and quota allocation in 
Norway, Iceland, Newfoundland and Denmark  
In Norway, the fundamental act for harvesting of marine resources is the Marine Resources Act 
(Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet 2008). The Marine Resources Act clearly states that the living 
marine resources belong to the Norwegian society as a whole. Its purpose is to ensure sustainable 
and economic profitable management of wild living marine resources, pursuing a precautionary 
and ecosystem approach, ensuring harvesting methods reducing the potential negative impacts. 
Moreover, it promotes an allocation of resources, which should help ensuring employment and 
settlement in rural communities. This is partly implemented in provisions (Participant regulation 
and concession regulation) which defines who can participate in commercial fishing. And other 
provisions regulates the structuring of the fishing fleet and vessels ability to increase their quota 
basis for respectively the coastal fleet and the off-shore fleet. In the license provision (for the off-
shore fleet) the level of concentration (maximum share of group quota allocated to one owner) is 
regulated, hence creating a kind of anti-trust regulation.   
The Participation Act (Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet 1999) regulates who can fish for a living 
(and acquire a licensed fishing vessel for commercial reasons). In order to fish a commercial 
license must be granted, which can only be given to Norwegian citizens (for vessels above 15 
meters) and to active fishers. Further the level of foreign labour is restricted. This is a central 
principle in Norwegian fisheries policy, meant to secure that the remuneration and returns from 
fishing (and potential resource rent), is channelled back to local coastal communities. The 
Participation Act regulates the need for limited entry, through vessel allotted licenses and annual 
permits, even though some fisheries remain open to entrants. It also gives the authorities the 
right to withdraw fishing rights or issue and allocate new fishing rights when conditions open for 
it, and the flexibility to alter the quota shares allocated among vessel groups and the regulation 
of fish stocks. 
Fishing rights are in theory not tradeable, since they are unsolvable associated with a vessel. In 
practice, however, rights are often traded by intricate transactions involving vessels, but 
dependent on authorities’ approval. The approval is more or less formal after a new 
governmental order in 2015, where fishing vessel owning companies were given the opportunity 
to agree privately on the transfer of a fishing permit/license without simultaneously transferring 
the vessel to which the permit originally belonged. The Norwegian system has previously been 
labelled, a system of “Individually Transferable Access” instead of individually transferable quotas 
(ITQs) (Williams & Hammer, 2000). 
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In Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) vessel owners have to be defined as professional fish harvesters to 
be eligible to apply for licenses and quotas. Professionalization is defined as a means to recognize special 
skills and experience required and to get 75% of the income from fishery (in the season). 
Professionalization can either be granted by “grandfathering” (documented long-term attachment to 
fisheries) or by qualifying for professionalization. New entrants must qualify through training and 
experience for professionalization through the Professional Fish Harvesters Certification Board (PFHCB, 
2015). Requirements for a new entrant as professional fish harvester:  
 Apprentice level: Be sponsored by a registered professional owner/operator or professional 
skipper on a designated fishing enterprise and complete basic safety training course.  
 Level I requirements: Minimum of two years of full-time fishing activities and must have earned 
55 land-based educational credits. 
 Level II requirements: Additional three years of full time fishing activities and additional 60 land-
based educational credits. This level allows the individual to acquire a fishing enterprise. 
 
The fisheries in NL are managed by species where the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) is 
responsible for management of the stocks in accordance with the roles and responsibilities outlined in 
Canada’s Fisheries Act. Environmental sustainability, economic viability and the inclusion of stakeholders 
in the decision-making process are key priorities for fisheries management in Canada (DFO 2015). A 
major objective of Canadian fisheries policy is to ensure that allocation of fishery resources is based on 
equality; taking into account closeness to the resource, the relative dependence of coastal communities 
and the various fleet sectors upon a given resource, as well as economic efficiency and fleet mobility. The 
coastal fleet has therefore a strong position within the NL fisheries sector. DFO allocates quotas for each 
stock within each fisheries management division (Department of Fisheries and Aquaculture, 2014). 
Decisions regarding quotas and TACs are made by the minister based on recommendations from DFO 
science and fisheries management. The quotas within each division are then distributed amongst the 
fleet sectors. For many of the demersal stocks the mainstay of the quotas are allocated to the coastal 
fleet (i.e. inshore and near shore vessels < 65’). 
Currently, all commercial fishing activities in Atlantic Canada are subject to limited entry licensing by 
DFO for inshore and offshore fisheries. Under Canada’s Fisheries Act, a fishing license is defined as an 
instrument by which the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans grants permission to a person to harvest 
certain species of fish or marine plants subject to the conditions attached to the license. Individual 
quotas are implemented as a condition on the fishing license and thus cannot be transferred (re-issued) 
unless the entire license is (Roy, 1997).  
In 2008 DFO introduced the enterprise combining policy as a means of permanently reducing the size of 
the fishing fleet without the need for DFO financial assistance. Under this policy, an independent core 
enterprise can purchase one other independent core enterprise, with the stipulation that one vessel 
registration and one core enterprise must be permanently retired. This approach enables the surviving 
core operator to potentially double his/her quotas or harvesting levels of key species (DFO 2008, 
Schrank, W. E. and Roy, N. 2013).  
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In Denmark ownership of vessel and quota rights requires that at least 2/3 of the capital to be owned by 
registered and active fishers, a way to keep the rights for the active fishers. Danish fisheries laws 
distinguish two classes of fishes, A-status and B-status. To be registered as a B-status fisher only requires 
a short safety course and documented income from fisheries. A-status is a precondition for owing a 
fishing vessel. To get the A-status the general requirements are Danish citizenship (or two year of work 
in Denmark) and 1 year as commercial fisher with at least 60 % of the income from the fisheries. For 
companies with several owners, at least 2/3 of the capital has to be owned by persons with a- or b-
status as fishers. (Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet 2017a). 
The quota allocation system is handled in the pelagic and demersal fisheries separately with de facto 
ITQs in the pelagics starting in 2003 and in the demersal sector in 2007. The quota shares (of the 
national TAC in the area) was allocated to individual vessels (and their owners) based on historical data. 
The first years the quota shares were closely linked to the vessel, e.g. could only be transferred with the 
vessel. However, this provision has been relaxed so parts of the quota share in the vessel can be 
transferred/sold to other vessels. There are restrictions in the allowed concentration of quota shares. In 
the demersal fisheries there is a limit of concentration of ownership in one vessel/company with a 
maximum 5-10 % of the total quota for the species in the relevant sea area. The maximum limit in the 
pelagic segment is 10-15 % per company. For pelagics there is a further limit of 10% of all pelagic quota, 
and 2% of the total pelagic quota if the vessel also owns demersal quota (Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet 
2017b).  
As a part of the introduction of transferable quota shares in the demersal fisheries in 2007, a special 
coastal fisher arrangement was established (Fødevareministeriet 2005). The purpose was to protect the 
coastal fisheries, minor vessels and minor ports and fishing communities. Vessels of max. 17m length 
with 80% of the fishing days being trips of less than 72 hours which chose to register as a coastal fisher 
were given extra quota of cod and sole. Being a part of this segment was binding for at least three years. 
The vessels in the coastal fishery segment could buy extra quota from vessels outside the coastal 
segment, but no quota could be sold to vessels outside the segment. The prices for quota tend to be 
higher outside the coastal segment than within, incentivizing to leave the coastal fisheries arrangement 
well ahead of exit for selling the quota for selling the quota at the general quota market.  
 Employment of foreign crew members is allowed according to the EU regulation. An agreement 
between the trade union and the fishermen’s association producer organizations though regulates this 
with agreement on preconditions of the foreign crew member to be able to document safety training 
and basic langue skills and the same working conditions as Danish labour (Danmarks Fiskeriforening og 
3f Transportgruppe 2014). The share of foreign labour is not known, but relative low. 
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In Iceland (ISL) an ITQ system was introduced in the main demersal fisheries in 1984, but quota systems had 
earlier been used in the herring fishery from 1975 and the capelin fishery from 1980. The quota system in the 
demersal fisheries only applied to vessels larger than 10 GRT. The main pressure for introducing the quota system 
was declining fish stocks and declining profits; first the collapse of the herring stock and later on the foreseeable 
collapse of the capelin stock unless preventive measures were adopted. The same can be said about the demersal 
species before 1983 when the stock had been declining due to over-fishing. During 1985-1990, the demersal fleet 
could choose between operating under an effort system based on the number of fishing days or a quota system, 
but in 1991 a comprehensive quota system came into effect for all vessels larger than 6 GRT. In subsequent years 
various effort systems were in place for smaller boats but it was really only a matter of time when they would also 
become subject to quota management.  
Currently, there are two different types of general fishing permits; a general fishing permit with a catch quota for 
vessels larger than 30 GRT, and a general fishing permit with a hook-and-line quota for smaller boats. The former 
is often referred to as the regular quotas and the latter as hook-and-line quotas (Agnarsson et al., 2016). Hook-
and-line quotas may only be utilised by boats that employ hand-line or longline. The management system 
distinguishes between two kinds of quotas. Quota shares or permanent quotas quantify the holders’ entitlement 
to a percentage of each year’s total allowable catch (TAC) of the species in question. Harvest rights, also called 
annual catch entitlements, are calculated as the product of each vessel’s quota shares and the TAC, and thus state 
how many kg or tons each vessel may catch during the fishing year (September 1st – August 31st). 
Hannesson (1994) has pointed out that the ownership of quotas involves the right to catch the fish but does not 
entail ownership of the fish stock. Thus, it is claimed that the quota does not mean the ownership of the fish but 
rather the right to catch the fish. The first article in the Fisheries Management Act no 116/2006 also states 
unequivocally that the “exploitable marine stocks of the Icelandic fishing banks are the common property of the 
Icelandic nation” and that the “allocation of harvest rights provided for by this Act neither endows indiv idual 
parties with the right of ownership nor irrevocable control over harvest rights” (Anon, 2006).  
A separate small boat quota system (isl. krókaaflamarkskerfi) is still available for boats less than 30 GT. These are 
only allowed to fish with hand-lines or longline. These boats get quotas for all the major demersal species and can 
freely transfer the quota within this system. However to prevent consolidation of fishing rights these quotas 
cannot be transferred to the common quota system. However, the small boats can buy quotas from vessels 
operating under the large quota system. 
In 2009 a new system was introduced for small boat called costal fishing (isl. strandveiði). In 2010 a total of 6000 
thousand tonnes were allocated for coastal fishing in one open access base from May to August. Coastal fishing 
is limited to small boats that are outside the quota system with two hand-lines and maximum 650 kg catch per 
day.  
By the 1990 Act the fishing year was set from Sept 1 to Aug 31 in the following year but previously it had been 
based on the calendar year. This was an effort to channel fishing of the groundfish stocks away from the summer 
months, when quality suffers more quickly and many regular factory workers are on vacation. 
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The aquaculture cases focus on Europe; Denmark, Spain, Norway and UK (Scotland). At the EU level, 
the CFP contains brief guidance for aquaculture, but environmental policies, especially the Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) outline further 
pertinent regulations. At the national level, the most important regulations determine site 
allocations and the national implementation of the WFD and MSFD and other national-level 
environmental regulations. The environmental regulations regard the internal environment (e.g. 
animal health) and external effects in form of emissions, the prevention of disease transmission to 
wildlife, and genetic intermingling between wild and farmed fish.  
The environmental issues are the most challenging for the aquaculture development – according to 
STECF: “The difficulty to integrate a viable aquaculture economy with environmental policy due to 
the environmental impact of aquaculture in Europe is a core barrier to the development of the 
sector,” (Nielsen and Motova, 2014). 
4.2.1 Site allocation and licenses 
Identification of sites for the plants and licences to produce farmed fish products are a central 
precondition for establishing aquaculture production.  
In the PrimeFish cases, various authorities and regulations are in play for establishing and operating 
an aquaculture plant. A central reason is the diversity of location of the plants: land-based, coastal 
adjacent locations or in the open sea. Local authorities are often responsible for permissions and 
area planning for land-based and coastal operations, and even for land-based facilities serving the 
sea-based plants (in that way the sea-based plants also depend on the zoning in land). The open sea-
areas are publically owned open space or at least not fully allocated, so the responsibility here are 
often spread on various sector based regulations and authorities. In Spain this differs a little. For 
establishing marine facilities national legislation and administration in principal handle the 
authorisation, though in most of the autonomous communities with coastline the regional 
governments has developed own legislation. Further parts of the coastline is private owned where 
especially authorisation for intake and discharge of water is central. This is given to all by the 
Hydrographic Conferences of the relevant automonous Community (regional level), see the Spanish 
casebox).  
In some cases establishing of an aquaculture plant requires an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA). Under which circumstances an EIA is required vary between the EU member states; in some 
states establishing a new aquaculture plant is in practice always required, where as other states only 
require an EIA for larger plants, in MSP areas etc.) (Dubolino 2016). The difference in EIA 
requirements are due to national regulations, all implementing EU directives (European Council 1985 
and later European Parliament and the Council 2001). To complete the EIA requirements is both time 
and money consuming, assessed to up to 50.000 $ in 2010 in the Scottish aquaculture (Skaski, 2010). 
National differences in the practice of require EIAs might therefore contribute to strength or weaken 
the competitiveness of the national aquaculture industry.  
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Permission to establish aquaculture plants are restricted due to concerns of area usage, competition 
for the physical areas with other actors and types of activities and environmental concerns regarding 
the use of local resources (water) and emissions to the surroundings. In practice, the factors are 
often interrelated in the decision process. 
Establishing an aquaculture plant requires that the area is already zoned for this type of activity. In 
land or near the coast it requires zoning in the relevant local or regional plans. If not, the plans have 
to be changed in a formal procedure allowing the area to be used for aquaculture activities. The sea 
areas are generally not planned at the same level as land. Often the planning is ad hoc, based on 
case-by-case processes where the relevant actors and the related sector policies and authorities are 
involved in the planning of location, taking into consideration the existing and possible future use of 
the area by different stakeholders. In the EU, the area planning is gradually being systematised with 
national implementation of the EU MSP-directive (European Parliament and the Council 2014). Still 
the MSP is quite complex having to take many sectoral policies into consideration (see the case box 
on Denmark)  
In the planning and zoning process other commercial interests such as maritime transportation, 
resource extraction and tourism are often stakeholders, but also environmental interests and NGOs 
that claim recreational or conservation interests for the possible environmental effects of 
aquaculture. Political and social concerns about prioritising green, local or small-scale producers in 
some cases also influences the siting process (as seen in the Norwegian case, see the box). Such 
provisions parallel the social concerns discussed in relation to fishing licences.  
 
4.2.2 Environmental regulation 
Environmental regulation concerns a range of factors from the use of water (especially for land-
based operations) to the impact on the wider environment through emissions of namely phosphorus 
and nitrogen, diseases from the farmed fish and their transmission to the wildlife and the genetic 
intermixing between the wild and escaped farm fish. 
The PrimeFish cases are under very similar, if not identical, environmental regulations. The Water 
Framework Directive (WFD), which covers inland and coastal water bodies, is implemented in the EU 
Member States as well as in the EEA state of Norway (Klima- og miljødepartementet 2016). The 
Marine Strategy Framework directive (MSFD), which addresses European seas, is not enforced in 
Norway, but the objectives, approach and methods are very similar to Norway’s integrated 
management plans (Norwegian ministry of Climate and Environment, 2016).  
These two environmental directives cover all of the EU, but are implemented in different ways 
among the countries. Despite having the same framework regulation, the differences result from 
varying political climates within Member States regarding environmental protection, as well as 
differences in the natural, environmental context of implementation. As an example of the latter: 
Finding physical space and especially ecological space for aquaculture plants might be hard, if the 
environmental system is already under pressure due to other activities inland (emissions from 
agricultural activities, larger cities, etc.). This is the situation in Denmark, where the recent political 
steps to offer new licenses to sea-based plants are questioned politically because of the general 
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critical environmental status of several Danish fjords and sea areas  (Prip, 2016), (Miljø- og 
fødevareudvalget 2017). The aquaculture plant will be in competition not only on the physical space, 
but also on the ecological space.  
Other regulations of the animal welfare focus on the farmed fish as well as the wildlife in the 
surroundings. Limits on the number of fish in each unit contributes to secure good living conditions 
for the farmed fish, but might also reduce the consequences on the wildlife in case of breakdown of 
cages, (e.g. a limitation of 200.000 fish in each farm unit in Norway), to reduce impact on the wildlife 
in case of breakdown of the cage.  
Some health regulations focus specifically on avoiding or controlling diseases by regulating 
movement of fish throughout the production value-chain (from eggs to juveniles to end production 
sizes) in order to avoid spreading of diseases. Other regulations focus directly on problems in 
aquaculture of specific species, as the serious problem in the salmon industry—sea or salmon lice. 
These parasites can have a negative impact on the welfare and health of farmed fish, but also for 
wild salmon and trout. The regulations for reducing the prevalence of sea lice thus focuses on 
protecting the production as well as impacts on wild fish (internal as well as external effects). Various 
regulations can be used, such as monitoring of lice incidents, reduction of density of the farmed fish 
and vaccination programs. In countries (such as Norway) with industry investments in strong 
programs for controlling the internal as well as the external effects of lice, the industry might have an 
advantage compared to less regulated and controlled countries in regard reduction of production 
effect, but higher costs for investment in measures to control the parasites internally and externally. 
Although environmental regulations ensure health and safety for the environment and seafood 
products, these environmental and animal health regulations can delay or limit the establishment 
and development of aquaculture plants, and increase the cost of production in the EU/EEA countries. 
This influences the competitiveness compared to countries outside the EU/EEA areas. But an EU 
Commission report  also concluded that environmental and health standards of the European 
regulation, WFD, MSFD and regulations on health and protection of the wildlife from alien species in 
aquaculture potentially increases the competitive advantage, if the consumer’s attention is drawn to 
quality and can improve local acceptance of aquaculture operations (European Commission, 2013). In 
the same line, a communication from the EU Commission, concludes that the high level of regulation 
is believed to be at least partly responsible for the positive image of Scottish salmon by international 
consumers with the price premium of around 10% due to Scottish provenance (European 
Commission, 2013a). 
The various regulations for gaining licences for establishing aquaculture plants – getting the area 
permissions and various environmental permissions is in all the case countries seen by the industry 
as an important challenge for development. This is clearly expressed by the Scottish industry:  
“The processes governing the establishment of new marine aquaculture operations are often 
viewed by industry as slow, disjointed and unpredictable in terms of application outcomes. Under 
the current system of consenting for aquaculture activity, there is perceived duplication, with 
overlaps between the input of Local Planning Authorities (LPAs), Marine Scotland, the Scottish 
Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) and other bodies. These can cause delays, expense and 
avoidable uncertainty of outcome” (Scotland Food and Drink, 2016). 
 
 www.primefish.eu Page 30 
 
This project has received funding from 
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 
research and innovation program 
under grant agreement No 635761 
 
4.2.3 Regulation of the concentration of aquaculture  
The physical construction of aquaculture plants and farms is regulated for environmental reasons as 
well. Economic concentration of licenses has been seen in all countries as a way to establish 
economies of scale. Limits and restrictions on concentration has gradually been reduced and large 
companies characterise parts of the aquaculture industry (especially in northern Europe), though a 
case under the EU Competitiveness Policy regarding merger in the aquaculture industry illustrates 
limits to the desire for concentration.  
In earlier periods, Norway prioritised granting licenses to small-scale, owner-operated farms with 
one license per person. This policy has later been liberalised leading to concentration in the 
Norwegian salmon industry. As an example in 2012 one company (Marine Harvest) had 20-30% of 
the total harvest of Atlantic salmon in Norway and two other firms held 10-20% each. This was seen 
as a problematic concentration by the EU Commission, but in relation to an EU anti-trust case a 
merger of two Norwegian companies with production, processing and marketing of salmon, Marine 
Harvest and Morpol, were seen as limiting the competition at the Scottish salmon market, as the 
merged companies would control of 40-50% of the salmon production. This share of the sector was 
seen as too high of a concentration and market control to get EU approval (European Commission 
2014b).  
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Text boxes 3: Case-boxes central aquaculture regulations in Norway, Scotland, Spain and Denmark 
In Norway various forms of less intensive aquaculture has a relatively long history in Norway. 
However, it is the relatively young industry around farming of salmonids such as Atlantic salmon and 
rainbow trout that has seen the sector grow to one of noteworthy economic importance on a national 
level, and of particular importance in a number of rural areas. 
The regulatory basis is founded in a number of acts with underlying provisions. Authority is distributed 
across several institutions and at several levels. Five ministries with underlying institutions and in total 
three levels of administration, state, county and municipality are involved. In total, businesses have 
about a dozen management institutions to adhere to. A resulting fragmentation of responsibilities and 
with some degree of overlap of authorities has been identified as problematic for good management 
(Robertsen et al 2016) 
Establishing aquaculture requires a license from the authorities. The Aquaculture Act specifies some 
requirements, but also gives the authorities leeway to decide whether a license should be granted. The 
law also specifies that a license is dependent on approval from the following acts; food, pollution control 
and harbour. Aquaculture on land also requires approval from the Water Resources Act. The institutions 
responsible for these acts therefore have a major influence on the sector. 
The distribution of licenses has been and still is a major political topic. Initially, small-scale, owner-
operated farms were favoured, and the regulations only allowed one license per person. Primarily 
through periods of economic problems, these restrictions have been lifted. Although there is a limit to 
the share of licenses an individual can control, these have small competiveness implications.  The 
geographic distribution was also important—the sector was to be a backbone of maintaining rural 
settlements. Hence licenses were initially tied to municipalities. The licenses are still tied to specific 
regions, and are only in special cases allowed to move to neighbouring regions. Licenses, initially non-
transferable, today can be transferred and mortgaged. 
Establishing a farm requires a physical site. The license cannot be granted if the area is not specifically 
defined for this purpose in the municipal plan, however the municipality can give dispensation from this 
requirement. The area plan is a political decision, but municipalities have formal responsibility to seek 
solutions to possible conflicts between interests and to make other considerations. Sea-based farms are 
placed in the commons thereby in areas without any defined owner. Other considerations, such as 
waterways for maritime transport, are managed by the coastal administration based on the Harbour 
Act.  
Authorities place emphasis on ensuring that the effects on fish are within ethically acceptable limits. 
These are generally defined in the Animal Welfare Act with underlying provisions. The Act is in practice 
managed by a government owned institution, the Food Safety Authority, with a central administration, 
decentralised offices and control and inspection routines. 
Operators are required to document and regularly update knowledge of fish welfare. Fish density in 
salmonid cages is limited to 25 kg/cubic meter. Farmers are required to monitor fish welfare and health 
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In Scotland the aquaculture sector is regulated by national and regional laws. In the UK the countries 
have devolved administrations with wide ranging legislative and executive powers including fisheries, 
aquaculture and environmental protection. Thus the following examples regard only Scotland and not 
necessarily the other three countries in the UK.  
A number of institutions are responsible for the aquaculture policy in Scotland. Fragmented 
legislation and lack of integration have been pointed out as limitations to aquaculture development 
(Marine Scotland, 2014). Hedley and Huntington (2009) report that the industry is “scrutinised by 10 
different statutory bodies and subject to more than 60 pieces of legislation, 43 European directives, 3 
European regulations and 12 European Commission decisions”.  
There is a perceived lack of available sites for the expansion of aquaculture in Scotland (Marine 
Scotland, 2009). However, as Hofherr et al. (2015) note, limitations to growth may be better 
explained by the competition for space which takes place at the local level with more established 
coastal economic activities or strong pressure from stakeholders with negative perception about 
aquaculture (Ertör and Ortega-Cerdà, 2015). 
To establish an aquaculture operation in Scotland involves several statutory bodies. The following are 
examples of some of these (Marine Scotland, 2014): 
 The Crown Estate is responsible for granting a seabed and the foreshore under the Crown 
Estate Act 1961.  
 Modifications to existing farms or planning permissions for new ones must be obtained from 
the relevant local planning authority under the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 
1997 (amended by the Planning etc. (Scotland) Act 2006). 
 Aquaculture activities expected to cause pollution or have potentially significant adverse 
impact on the environment also require authorisation from SEPA under the Water 
Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulation 2011. Aquaculture farms must also 
be registered under the Aquatic Animal Heath (Scotland) Regulations 2009 (amended 2011). 
 The supply and possession of veterinary medicines is regulated through the veterinary 
medicines Regulations 2011 (amended 2012) and incorporated a multitude of EU regulations. 
 
The Aquaculture and Fisheries Act 2007 covered a number of legislative areas relating to aquaculture 
operations including controlling parasites on fish and shellfish farms, treatment of disease, 
prevention and escapees. The act was amended in 2013 to include a legal requirement for 
cooperation between farms within a management area in fish health management, movement of 
fish, harvesting and fallowing (Scottish minister 2015). 
No regulation against economic concentration is found in national legislation, but the EU anti-trust 
regulation has been used to reduce the marked dominance of the Norweigian owned Marine Harvest 
after planned merge with the Norwegian company Morpol. In a merger they would control 40-50% of 
the salmon production in Scotland and 70-80% of the Scottish share of the high value “label Rouge” 
market. The merge was only accepted by the EU Commission after some of the salmon production 
plants in Scotland was sold to third parties (European Commission 2014, b and c). 
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In Spain, the aquaculture industry is regulated by national laws (often implementation of EU 
directives), but also sometimes different laws at regional level due to the autonomous communities. 
The aquaculture industry is organised in various different professional organisations, some of which 
are defined geographically.    
According to the legislation, commercial farming of aquatic species is allowed only to those Spanish 
citizens and organizations that have been registered as business enterprises (Jefatura del Estado 1984: 
Law Nº23/1984 of Marine Cultivation). The concession or authorization confers the right to set up an 
aquaculture activity in a specific area and may concern either a single species or a group of species. There 
are slightly different administrative procedures depending of where the plants is supposed to be and 
area ownership: a) inland aquaculture facilities, b) marine aquaculture facilities within publicly owned 
coastal zones and c) marine aquaculture facilities within privately owned coastal zones utilizing publicly 
owned zones for collecting/discharging water. 
The inland facilities need a “Concession for the use or occupation of the public water area” and an 
“Authorization for the intake and discharge of water”, both from the regional Hydrographic conference. 
Further a “Construction and start of operations permit” from the municipal authorities, an 
“Authorization for operation of the aquaculture facility” and to complete an “Environmental Impact 
Assessment”. The marine aquaculture facilities further needs a “Concession for the occupation of the 
public shoreline” from the Ministry of Aquaculture. The “Authorization for the intake and discharge of 
water” is included for facilities in public waters, but has to be obtained for facilities at private owned 
coastal zones.  
Especially the inland facilities has to complete an Environmental Impact Assessment (Jefatura del 
Estado 1984: Law Nº21/2013 on environmental evaluation), including: 
 General description of the project and forecasts over time on the use of land and other natural 
resources. Estimation of the types and amounts of waste dumped and emissions. 
 Exposure of the main alternatives studied, and a justification of the main reasons for the 
solution adopted, taking into account the environmental effects. 
 Evaluation and quantification of the project's direct or indirect, cumulative and synergistic 
effects on population, human health, flora, fauna, biodiversity, geodiversity, soil, subsoil, air, 
water, climate change, landscape, material assets, and interaction between all of the above 
factors during the implementation, exploitation and during the demolition or abandonment of 
the project. 
 Measures to prevent, correct and, compensate for adverse effects on the environment. 
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In Denmark, the aquaculture industry has traditionally been land-based production of rainbow trout. 
Still two-thirds of the production originate from land-based farms. Over the years, many small local 
farms have been reduced in numbers. At the same time, the size of the remaining farms increased 
which has led to a stable production volume over the years 
Licenses and approvals for aquaculture operation establishment or expansion differ between the land-
based (and sea-based up to 1 nm from the coast), and sea-based outside 1 nm from the coastline. The 
land-based plants need an environmental approval from the municipality and other approvals. The 
environmental approval is an 8-10 year approval to produce within a described environmental 
framework. The minor plants are regulated by a limit on volume of feed to be used while the larger 
plants in general are regulated by emissions limits. All expansions or changes of existing plants must go 
through a full Impact Assessment on the Environment (IAE), which is also included in the Natura 2000 
regulation. Furthermore, the land-based plant has to have a permission for the use of surface- or 
ground water (Dansk Akvakultur no.d.). The (rare) location of new plants has to be in accordance with 
the zoning of the city plans.  
Sea-based plants are meant to apply for permission according to the fisheries law and the provisions 
include conditions for production and operation, owner control, acceptance from the food agency 
(animal health and food safety). New or altered aquaculture operations are also supposed to seek 
environmental approval according to chapter five in the law on environmental protection, referring to 
polluting activities (Miljø- og Fødevareministeriet 2016). This will involve the regulation regarding EIA 
and the habitat-regulation (Dansk Akvakultur n.d.). Licenses and permissions are given by the state 
(e.g. the Danish AgriFish Agency), as the sea is common property. New licences have so far been given 
on an ad hoc basis, taking a range of sector legislation, relevant for the site, into consideration. A new 
Danish law (Erhvervs- og Vækstministeriet 2016), implementing the Marine Spatial Planning directive 
(European Parliament and the Council 2014) lists 14 fully or partially overlapping laws and acts already 
regulating the sea area to be taken into consideration.     
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4.3 Processing and export: 
Within the EU, entry into the processing or export of seafood is generally not regulated as the 
primary activities in fisheries or aquaculture.  But the processing sector faces other legislative 
barriers, which can influence their competitiveness. Trade regulations regarding raw material access 
and tariffs are the most important and to some degree general production conditions such as 
veterinary and technical regulations are also relevant.  
4.3.1 Raw material regulations  
In general, there is an open market for fish in Europe, though with a few examples of protective 
measures during the last years. In a situation where access to raw materials is a competitive 
parameter (European Commission 2014c), regulative restrictions on landing of wild fish can be 
important for the competitiveness of the processing and exporting industries. Some countries wish 
to ensure resources (and thereby jobs) for the national processing industry by establishing incentives 
to land the national quota at home or restricting landings abroad, often via the landing regulation in 
the fisheries and quota allocation. This of course influences the competitive balance between 
industries in the various countries. As an example, Faroese vessels pay a fee for landing their pelagic 
catches of the national quota abroad, while the Scottish minister intends to give a quota bonus to 
Scottish landings of mackerel in Scotland (Harkel, 2017 and Fishing news 2017). This influences the 
level of landings in e.g Norway that traditionally has been a landing place for some Faroese and 
Scottish vessels.  
In some countries sourcing of wild fish for the industry can be ensured by industries owing their own 
vessels and quotas (e.g. in Iceland). In other countries, the restriction of vessel ownership (as 
described above in 3.1) disables this opportunity (e.g. in Norway and Denmark) as vessels (and 
quotas) in general can only be owned by active fishers. However, fishers are allowed to own 
processing industries, which can be a way to establish vertical integration between the two links in 
the value chain. In the aquaculture sector there are no limitations for processors to integrate 
backwards in the value chain and buy aquaculture farms in order to secure access to raw material. 
The opportunity to integrate in the value chain has in some countries (as Scotland, Norway and Faroe 
Islands) lead to large fully integrated companies which cover the value chain from hatching and 
farming over processing to sale and export of consumer ready products.  
4.3.2 Tariffs  
The trade tariffs and contingents are established to protect the national industry and to stabilise the 
raw material supply for the industry within the country or groups of countries covered. At national 
and company level the cost for raw materials can vary depending of the position in the market, e.g. 
depending whether the source of raw materials for the production are national resources or 
imported resources with tariffs.  
At the European market the competitiveness of the company depends on their position as selling 
from within or outside the EU and the bi- and multilateral trade agreements negotiated between the 
country and the EU. As described in section 2, the CETA agreement will significantly reduce these 
tariffs and over some years eliminate all EU tariffs for Canadian fish. This will increase the 
competitiveness of the Canadian exporting processors, while other companies (EU or other non-EU) 
will lose relative competitiveness in this process. EU has established various trade agreements 
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leading to different tariffs. As members of EEA, Norway and Iceland are in some regards favoured by 
better trading agreements than the so-called Most Favoured Nations (MFN), which are the nations 
under WTO, which EU has no (free) trade agreements). The advantages for Norway compared to the 
MFN can be seen in the table below, while after CETA Canada will have 0-tariffs on most products, 
then being more favoured than Norway. The table also illustrates the challenges for companies from 
third countries (non-EU member s) to gain market access due to the tariffs, which tend to favour the 
local, tariff-free fish for the imported. Further it illustrates that the import tariffs of processed fish is 
higher than for fresh or low-processed fish (except for filets of cod from Most Favoured Nations in 
the table below). This difference favour processing jobs within EU and challenges attempts to move 
up the value chain by companies in third countries, then facing higher tariffs at the EU market for the 
processed products. 


















Salmon     Nor 2 % 2 % 13 % 5,5%     
MFN  2 % 2 % 13 % 5,5%     
Cod           Nor 0% 0,9%   0% 0% 3,9%  
MFN 12% 18% and 
7,5% 
  16% 13% 13%  
Herring     Nor 15%* 15% and 
free** 
  0%   20% 




  20% 
 * Zero tariffs in the period 15 February to15 June  
**Including butterflies  
***Butterflies: From 1 January to 14 February and from 16 June to 31 December: 15%. WTO tariff quota. From 15 February 
to 15 June: free. 
 
 
4.3.3 Other regulation 
The EU’s veterinary regime is based on the WTO guidelines on “The Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” (SPS-agreement) and “The Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade” (TBT-agreement). EU has increased the requirements for third countries exporting products 
to the EU. These include EU approval of the national systems (laws, organisation of authorities etc.), 
as well as EU approval of lists of specific companies which are approved to export into the EU. 
Norway as the non-EU country in this case participates in the EU veterinary regime and therefore 
does not face any SPS barriers. Nonetheless, there may be barriers for Norway regarding standards 
not fully harmonised with the EU-standards. Other third party countries might face barriers of both 
SPS and TBT issues. Likewise, European countries face the same type of problems when exporting to 
other countries, especially regarding differences in technical barriers. 
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